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THE LEGACY OF HOLMES AND BRANDEIS. By

Samuel ]. Kone/sky. New

York: Macmillan. 1956. Pp. ix, 316. $6.

"[H]e shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint ... Judges of the supreme Court . ..." So prescribes
the Constitution for the President. For few presidents with multiple opportunities-perhaps for only one-can there be strong support for a claim
of a high average of excellence in the performance of this constitutional
duty. In many more than a majority of instances, presidential appointments to the Supreme Court have brought distinction of place to men who
did not match that distinction with distinction of performance in the subtle
and difficult responsibilities of their office. This, of course, judges presidential performances after the event, but from many appointees it seems
clear that a dispassionate and qualified observer would not at the time have
expected exceptional performance. Perhaps the chorus of politely restrained approval which usually greets those appointments not evoking
active opposition manifests, at least among the informed, more of hope
than of expectation.
Justice Frankfurter has recently had occasion to tell us,1 in specific
terms, what an appropriate appointee to the Court need not be or haveand in more general terms what he should. In the course of doing so, he
found that a consensus of informed judgment would establish a roster of
distinction which would number sixteen, or possibly nineteen, men from
among the seventy-five who have been members of the Court, omitting
consideration of fifteen (now sixteen) contemporary and relatively recent
members. It is possible to question both the size and the composition of
this roster, but it seems fairly clear that membership has not been awarded
with reluctant hand or niggardly spirit. More lively debate, or more positive opinion, might be anticipated were we to attempt to decide whether
the ratio of distinction would be maintained, or even increased, had the
discreet omission been omitted.
Even on a roster of judicial distinction much diminished by more
stringent standards of admission, most lawyers, and certainly most students
of the law, would expect to find the names of Justices Holmes and Brandeis.
Each brought to the Supreme Court high professional competence, earlier
manifested in rather divergent fashions. Each was the possessor of a keen
and wide-ranging intelligence-ranging, as it happened, in different directions. Each performed his judicial task in characteristic manner by the
full utilization of these attributes. But each had as well the ability, neces-

1 Frankfurter, "The Supreme Court in the Mirror of Justices," 105
781 (1957).
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sary to some extent for any judge deemed distinguished on a nation-shaping court, to view with critical detachment against a horizon enlarged in
time and space, not only the cases before him but also the institution of
V:h~c:h 1,ie was a part, its and his function and performance, and the nation
which it shares in shaping-perhaps to constrict, perhaps to develop. In
short, each was able to an uncommon degree "to see things as they are,"
if we may borrow Arnold's compressed phrase, an ability the very desire
for which, as Arnold remarked, "implies a balance and regulation of mind
which is not often attained· without fruitful effort."
· Finding sharp and continued disagreements among later Justices who
were thought to share in what had become known as the Holmes-Brandeis
tradition, Mr. Konefsky has set himself the task of looking into that tradition, if such there was, of examining and appraising separately the attitudes and judicial performances of the two Justices who so often, in their
sixteen years together on the Supreme Court, agreed with each other in
disagreeing with all or most of their brethren. The result of Mr. Konefsky's
investigation is to establish, certainly to his own satisfaction, that the title
deeds of the two Justices' claims to distinction are by no means uniform in
their merit, and that the so-called tradition which had been thought an
alloy made more enduring by the blending of complementing elements was
in fact an unstable mixture of disparate materials. The varying appraisals
of these components are indicated by two sentences from the closing
pages (p. 306) of the study. Of Brandeis: "The fusion of richly informed
judgment and high social purpose is his legacy to the judicial process." Of
Holmes: "Awareness of human fallibility is no justification, however, for
moral indifference on the part of those holding high public office."
Mr. Konefsky's pained estimate of Justice Holmes' shortcomings is not
based upon those bravura passages-perhaps bravado, perhaps seriously in~ended, perhaps partly both-from Holmes' speeches which have evoked
other hostile comment in recent years. Rather, his method is to sample
what are deemed relevant actions and attitudes of both Holmes and
Brandeis before their advent upon the Supreme Court, and thereafter to
consider several limited, though still important, areas of their judicial activities while on the Court. The scope of the areas considered is adequately
indicated by the ultimate conclusions that while Bi:andeis was a man of
economics and one who cared deeply about the results of social arrangements, Holmes' economics was outdated or obsolete, and he lacked humanitarian passion; while Holmes had some part in developing constitutional
protection for speech, nevertheless Brandeis "took the theory much more
seriously than did Holmes." (p.' 202) All this and more demonstrates, if
demonstration were needed, that Holmes was not a Liberal, as Mr. Konefsky
uses that word. It appears to follow therefore-no doubt is suggested about
the inevitability of the conclusion-that he could not be a judge of the first
rank, perhaps not even a worthy one. In fact, it seems to be clearly suggested: tliough not quite explicitly stated, that the great reputation as a
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Supreme Court Justice with which Justice· Holmes ·retired, was derivative
and synthetic. This is indicated by the fact that when the Justice reached
seventy-five, after almost fourteen years on the Court, and just before the
appointment of Brandeis, several law reviews dedicated issues or otherwise
paid tribute to him. It is the content of these tributes which Mr. Konefsky
finds revealing. In the Harvard Law Review,2 for example, the tributes
touch on Holmes the historian, Holmes the common law lawyer·and judge,
Holmes the philosopher, but only one deals specifically with his work on the
Supreme Court.3 On the other hand, when Holmes retired sixteen years
later, he was thought of principally as a Supreme Court Justice, and -Sir
Frederick Pollock had to appeal to his countrymen not to forget his service
to the common law. If Mr. Konefsky does not quite conclude, he is clearly
not unwilling to have his readers believe, that Holmes owed to the presence
of Brandeis his latter-day development as a public law judge, such as Mr.
Konefsky concedes it may have been.
That Brandeis contributed to the development of Holmes, as Holmes
did to Brandeis, and as others of their associates inevitably did to both,. it
would be foolish to question. But to find denigrating significance in the
attempt of a law review editor to achieve comprehensive coverage, particularly at a time when public law occupied much less a focal position iµ
the law reviews generally than it does today, appears to indicate a mind
eager to reach its conclusion. It may be enlightening to note than• when
the Harvard Law Review came to pay tribute to Justice Holmes on his
ninetieth birthday in 1931,4 the composition of its dedicatory issue is npt
radically different from that of 1916. To find significant difference_ in the
tributes paid to Holmes in 1916 and in the 1930's, if it existed, may be a
more accurate indicator of the change in public or professional interest
and appreciation than it is a measure of the development of the judge.
Aside from the free speech cases, which began to come to the Court in
significant number and context only later, it would be as safe a generalization as any to say that the lines of Holmes' contributions to the development of constitutional and other public law were clearly ascertai~able ·by
1916.
.
.
In his review and appraisal of the work of the Supreme Court and its
members, Mr. Konefsky's writing has certain unfortunate characteristics.
Spacious and question-begging adjectives are often substitutes f~r analysis,
as are frequent quotations of the conclusions of other commentators, quotations which range without apparent differentiation from the fatUOl,!S
through the sentimental to the perceptive and acute. But what some might

2

29 HARv. L. REv. 601 et seq. (1916).

That one did not suggest a limited stature for Holmes as Justice of the Supreme
Court. Frankfurter, "The Constitutional Opinions of Justice Holmes," 29 HARV. L. REv.
683 (1916).
~ 44 HARv. L. REv. 677 et seq. (1931).
3
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think its principal weakness is that Mr. Konefsky's study is written in terms
which suggest a serialized account of recurrent clashes between the Goods
and the Bads. His conclusion, as indicated above, is that while Justice
Brandeis enjoyed a merited pre-eminence among the Goods, Justice Holmes
fell in with that side quite fortuitously, and never earned the place which
popular opinion mistakenly awarded him on its Team. In the course of
reaching these conclusions, there are several curious anomalies. Holmes'
dissent, which supported resale price maintenance, in the Dr. Miles Medical Company case is one of the items cited as "evidence that he was not
only illiberal but a downright reactionary." (p. 59) It is not mentioned
that Brandeis, the man of economics, the "social scientist with a conscience,"
was, before his appointment to the Court, warm in his support of resale
price maintenance, spoke in favor of it before businessmen, and advocated
before a congressional committee legislation which would have sanctioned it.
Perhaps as curious and as revealing a comment as any is made in Mr.
Konefsky's appraisal of the Holmes dissent in Lochner, a comment which
may speak for itself: "Strictly speaking, therefore, what separated Holmes
from the majority in the Lochner case was a matter of degree, a difference
of view as to whether the New York legislature was justified in curtailing
freedom of action in the circumstances disclosed by the case. Moreover,
since Holmes saw no need for research to establish the reasonableness of
the New York law, his dissent may fairly be described as altogether lacking
in constructive criticism. In a fundamental sense, it was no more than a
moral preachment, an earnest plea for judicial self-restraint." (p. 42)
Whatever Holmes' judicial limitations, and there were some which Mr.
Konefsky does not mention, his approach to personification of Marshall's
famous admonition that "we must never forget it is a constitution we are
expounding" is .likely to place him for some time among the forefront of
Justices of the American Supreme Court, despite Mr. Konefsky's doubting
appraisal.
To those who have a concept of the judicial function differing from
that of Mr. Konefsky-and the group may include some lawyers-the more
damaging portrait, if it were accepted as accurate, would be that of Justice
Brandeis. Mr. Konefsky speaks of him-and in each case approval appears
to be indicated-as the "crusader" (p. llO), the "social scientist with a conscience" (p. 163), whose "sympathies ... were deeply engaged in many of
the causes before him; no one can attribute to him such impartiality [ as
Holmes'] or lack of concern over social policy and its consequences."
(p. 140) "It was Brandeis whose opinions conveyed the definite impression that he personally attached the same 'importance' to the 'ends' as did
the legislators who were seeking to implement them." (p. 162) "No wonder so many of his opinions give the impression that he was less concerned
with his role as a judge and far more with the cause of effective government." (p. 156) "Indeed, a judge for whom the social consequences of
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adjudication were as compelling as they were for Brandeis may be assumed
not to have worried about logical consistency." (p. 265) All this is con•
sistent with, and supports, the attributed conclusion "that the Justice
employed his judicial opinions as a vehicle for broadcasting economic
and social ideas which he wished to see advanced. . . . His main concern
was with the strategy for effectuating his pet theories, a fact said to ex•
plain why so many of his opinions are really ingenious briefs. The 'open•
mindedness' of the man was in his 'manner' but did not disturb the
'substance' of his beliefs." (p. 163) There are the somewhat equivocal
qualifications that "The fact that Brandeis did not have a completely
closed mind on economic matters is confirmed . . ." (p. 177), and that
"any suggestion that Brandeis carried his personal predilections to unreasonable lengths would distort the essentially statesmanlike character
of his economic philosophy, but especially his conception of the judicial
function." (p. I 73)
This may be the Brandeis which some, possibly even some judges,
see today. If it were an accurate portrait there would be many who would
believe that such a judge more than merited Pope's rebuke, "Most critics,
fond of some subservient art, Still make the whole depend upon a part:
They talk of principles, but notions prize, And all to one lov'd folly
sacrifice." But to reduce Brandeis from humanist to humanitarian is
"to sink from ethos to pathos," and recalls Babbitt's related remark that
"How the humanitarian loses proportionateness is plain; it is by his
readiness to sacrifice to sympathy the ninety per cent or so of the virtues
that imply self-control." Fortunately, there is abundant evidence both
in the United States Reports and from other trustworthy sources,5 of a
different Brandeis-of a character both on and off the bench well endowed
with restraint and proportionateness. Brandeis, as did Holmes, had
"perception not only of the pastness of the past, but of its presence."
Neither would have been found among the claque for Dr. Cole:µso.

Ernest J. Brown,
Professor of Law,
Harvard University

5

Cf. Freund, "Mr. Justic~ Brandeis: A Centennial Memoir," 70
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